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The  EU  is  at  the  forefront  of  an  emerging  pattern  in  international  relations,  so-called 
biregionalism. The Union increasingly seeks to establish relations with other world regions 
while  actively  promoting  the  emergence  of  regional  integration  projects.  The  EU’s 
relationship with Mercosur is unique in this regard as it is the only currently existing form of 
“pure interregionalism” between two customs unions (Aggarwal/Fogarty 2004). As biregional 
relationships are a relatively new phenomenon in the international system, this paper asks 
how the EU sets out to structure them. Applying a governance approach to the case study of 
EU-Mercosur relations, it analyses the extent to which policy transfer is considered a viable 
strategy by the three main European institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) in this 
regard. It draws on the policy transfer framework developed by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 
2000) to dissect the EU policy-making process to formulate a policy vis-à-vis Mercosur. It 
asks what the EU is inclined to transfer, what role each of the three European institutions 
plays in the process and what the reasons and justifications for such a strategy are. It argues 
that a lot of the concepts used in the formation of these external relations have their origin in 
internal  EU  policies  and  suggests  that  this  strategy  can  be  considered  a  form  of  external 
governance that does not differ fundamentally from governance in the domestic realm. In 
addition, it posits that the use of policy transfer in the formation of the EU external relations 
has clear “normative connotations” based on an EU-specific idea of international order (Faust 
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Biregional relations are a form of ‘new regionalism’ in a changing global world order (Telò 
2001). The European Union (EU) increasingly seeks to establish such relations with other 
world  regions  while  actively  promoting  the  emergence  of  regional  integration  projects 
(Söderbaum/Stålgren/Langenhove 2005). Mercosur (Common Market of the South) is one of 
these biregional partners. It was established in 1991 by the four founding countries Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Together with the EU, it is the “most ambitious regional 
integration mechanism in the world” whose intentions go beyond mere economic integration 
to encompass political objectives as well (Faust 2005: 42). The EU established first contacts 
with  Mercosur  shortly  after  its  founding  which  have  since  been  continuously  expanded. 
Currently, the EU is in the process of negotiating an association agreement with the Southern 
Cone which would include far-reaching trade liberalisation alongside political dialogue and 
cooperation in different fields.  
 
As such biregional relations are  a “new  animal” in the international system (Grabendorff 
1999:  106),  the  EU  does  not  dispose  of  established  instruments  to  structure  them. 
Furthermore,  it  can  neither  draw  on  the  more  traditional  foreign  policy  instruments  of 
diplomacy  and  military  strength.  In  this  context,  the  article  asks  how  the  EU  sets  out  to 
structure such relationships. It analyzes in how far the EU is inclined to use policy transfer as 
a  governance  strategy  in  these  relations.  The  question  of  where  the  concepts  to  structure 
external relations come from and what they are promises to give us more general insights into 
the governance of the EU’s external relations in a changing international context. This article 
will argue that a lot of the concepts used in the formation of the EU’s external relations have 
their origin in internal EU policies and hence, that policy transfer is a widely used tool to 
construct them, even though the EU does not hold the formal competences to “formulate and 
apply border-crossing rules” in Mercosur (Neyer 2002: 14).
1 The article further suggests that 
this strategy can nevertheless be considered a form of external governance that does not differ 
fundamentally from governance in the domestic realm.  
 
The article proceeds as follows: the next section briefly sketches the historical development of 
EU-Mercosur relations. The third section outlines the policy transfer model developed by 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) and adapts it to account for policy export in the external 
relations of the EU. The fourth part analyses policy transfer in EU-Mercosur relations along 
four transfer dimensions and across the three pillars of the biregional relations: trade and 
economic  cooperation,  political  dialogue  and  cooperation.
2  The  fifth  section  analyses  the 
relationship between policy transfer and external governance and asks whether policy transfer 
is a form of external governance. The conclusion sketches out some lines for further research.  
 
 
EU-Mercosur Relations in Historical Perspective 
 
The first contacts between the EU and today’s Mercosur member states reach back to the time 
before the South American integration project was founded. At that time, the interaction was 
embedded within the European Community’s (EC) relations with the entire Latin America 
                                                 
∗ I would like to thank Ingeborg Tömmel and Rebecca Steffenson for their helpful comments on this paper.  
1 In this context, Neyer introduces the issue of power talking about exercising “political Herrschaft beyond the 
nation state” (2002: 14, my italics).  
2 Besides drawing on strategy documents of the three central EU institutions, the article relies on four interviews 
conducted between August and September 2004 with civil servants in the Commission (3) and the General 
Secretariat of the Council (1).    
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continent. It was at the beginning of the 1980s that the EC appeared on the political stage in 
the region. Back then, the EC was actively engaged in the San José process working together 
with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Peru in the Lima Group towards a peaceful solution of 
the violent conflicts in Central America.
3 Hence, since that time the EC interacted on a regular 
and institutionalized basis with three of the later four founding members of Mercosur.  
 
When Mercosur was founded on 26 March 1991, it was the Commission that took the lead in 
establishing  the  first  informal  contacts  (Diedrichs  2003:  117).  These  contacts  led  to  an 
Interinstitutional  Cooperation  Agreement  between  the  Commission  and  the  Group  of  the 
Common Market, Mercosur’s executive organ, signed in 1992 to support regional integration 
in the Southern Cone. This incipient interaction pattern was soon supplemented by the signing 
of  the  Joint  Solemn  Declaration  in  1994  which  laid  down  the  intention  to  negotiate  an 
interregional political and economic association between the two sides. In 1995, the EU and 
Mercosur signed a Framework Agreement which sets out the parameters for the negotiations 
of the Association Agreement presently underway. It entered into force in 1999 and forms the 
current treaty basis of the biregional relations. The document entails cooperation in various 
fields including trade, the economy and development and establishes a political dialogue to be 
conducted  independently  of  the  consultations  with  the  Rio  Group  of  which  all  Mercosur 
countries are members. In addition, it envisages the conclusion of an interregional association 
which constitutes a “significant shift in policy” as the association status has formerly only 
been grated for historical (Lomé Conventions) or political reasons in the direct neighbourhood 
of the EU (Smith 1998: 161).  
 
The  negotiations  currently  underway  for  the  Interregional  Association  Agreement  were 
officially opened in November 1999 and were supposed to be concluded in October 2004. 
This goal was not reached, however, due to continuing differences in the trade field. While 
the chapters on political dialogue, cooperation and the support for regional integration are 
ready for signature, the agricultural sector on the side of the EU and the service and public 
procurement sectors on the side of Mercosur are still contested. Once signed, it would be the 
first treaty ever between two customs unions and a “model … for a new kind of cooperative 
relationship … in a multipolar world” (ESC 2001: 5).  
 
 
The Policy Transfer Model 
 
In  two  literature  reviews  published  in  Political  Studies  (1996)  and  Governance  (2000), 
Dolowitz  and  Marsh  developed  an  encompassing  policy  transfer  model  drawing  together 
studies  on  ‘policy  diffusion’  (Walker  1969,  Gray  1973),  ‘policy  convergence’
4  (Bennett 
1991), ‘lesson-drawing’ (Rose 1993) and ‘policy learning’ (Hall 1993) under a single research 
framework. All of these models seek to explain how policies cross borders in space and time. 
They deal with a “process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of 
policies,  administrative  arrangements,  institutions  and  ideas  in  another  political  setting” 
(Dolowitz/Marsh 2000: 5). This is also the definition Dolowitz and Marsh use for policy 
transfer.  
                                                 
3 The so-called Lima Group was founded in 1985 as a support organisation for the Contadora Group (Colombia, 
Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) formed in 1983. Both groups joined forces in the Caraballeda Declaration of 
1986 to form the Rio Group with which the EU institutionalized contacts in the Rome Declaration in 1990 
(Piening 1997: 123-130; Viñas 1991: 350-52). 
4 For a good overview of recent developments in the field of policy convergence and its application to the EU 




The policy transfer model is mostly used in comparative public policy studies where it was 
originally developed  (Walker 1969) and has been applied to the EU before.  In so doing, 
however,  it  primarily  concentrates  on  policy  transfer  within  the  EU,  both  between  the 
different  EU  levels  (primarily  between  the  national  and  supranational  level)  as  well  as 
between member states (Majone 1991, Radaelli 2000, Bomberg/Peterson 2001, Jordan et al. 
2003). Even though it is ever more recognized that “[t]he EU seems increasingly eager to 
export  its  internal  policy  models  to  its  external  partners”  (Steffenson  2002:  1),  the 
phenomenon is seldom explored in a coherent and systematic fashion outside of the EU’s 
direct neighbourhood (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004, Longo 2003).  
 
The policy transfer model is not a full-blown theory, but can rather be described as a “’road 
map’ for exploring different policy making processes” (Steffenson 2002: 2-3). It serves to 
identify the important variables in the process and allows analysing its characteristics and 
differences.  In  this  article,  I  adopt  (but  regroup)  four  of  the  five  research  questions  by 
Dolowitz and Marsh and adapt them to the peculiarities of the “EU’s own brand of policy 
transfer” (Bomberg/Peterson 2000: 19) – namely policy export in its external relations. The 
focus  is  on  EU’s  intentions  to  such  transfer  –  the  eventual  outcomes  and  hence  its 
effectiveness as a governance strategy in EU-Mercosur relations are not considered.
5 In other 
words, instead of looking at the process of international negotiations between both sides, I 
consider  the  internal  EU  policy  making  process  aimed  at  adopting  a  EU-policy  vis-à-vis 
Mercosur. 
 
What is being transferred? (Transfer objects) 
 
Policy transfer can generally encompass any element that is important in political processes. 
Dolowitz  and  Marsh  distinguish  eight  categories  of  transfer  objects:  policy  goals,  policy 
content, policy instruments, policy programmes, institutions, ideologies, ideas/attitudes and 
negative lessons. They highlight the distinction between the terms policy and programme. 
While the former is a broader statement about the intentions, motives and objectives that 
policy-makers wish to follow, the latter refers to the specific means to implement the policy. 
Hence, a policy can encompass various programmes. In regard to the EU’s policy export, 
negative lessons may be eliminated as they refer to forms of policy import. If the EU changes 
its policy export intentions because of perceived failure in the past, this may be captured 
positively by the other categories when the EU adapts policy objects due to internal learning 
processes.  
 
Who are the agents involved in transfer? (Transfer actors) 
 
In principle, one can distinguish between borrowers and lenders in the policy process. An 
active role of the lender, however, has long been neglected as the focus has mainly been on 
(voluntary) policy import, so-called ‘lesson drawing’ (Rose 1993). Only recently has more 
attention been paid to international organisations and non-state actors involved in the transfer 
of policies, which also brought the lender back into the scientific focus (Stone 2000, 2004). 
Dolowitz and Marsh identify nine categories of actors including elected officials, political 
parties,  civil  servants,  pressure  groups,  policy  entrepreneurs  and  experts,  transnational 
corporations, think tanks, supranational governmental and non-governmental institutions as 
                                                 
5 By restricting the analysis to EU intentions to policy transfer, I circumvent the problem of many intervening 
variables when only looking at the outcome of such a process. As the interest is in policy transfer as an EU 
external governance strategy, the actual success of such transfer would aim at the effectiveness of such a strategy 
instead of the strategy itself.   
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well as consultants. The role of different actors in the transfer process and their respective 
impact on the outcome are heavily contested in the literature (Haas 1992, Robertson 1991, 
Bomberg/Peterson 2000, Stone 1999, 2000). It is clear, however, that different actors play 
their  role  in  the  process  of  policy-making  and  transfer.  As  this  article  focuses  on  policy 
transfer intentions of the lender, i.e. the policy formulation stage in a process of policy export, 
it will only consider the three most important actors in the EU during that stage: the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP).
6 This coincides 
with Dolowitz and Marsh’s categories of elected officials (Council), political parties (EP) and 
civil  servants  (Commission).  Whoever  acts  as  a  policy  entrepreneur  in  the  institutional 
interplay within the Union will be considered separately. We should expect the respective 
policy-making powers to have a significant impact on the role each actor plays in the different 
fields of the biregional relations.  
 
Why and how is a policy transferred? (Transfer reasons and forms) 
 
Dolowitz and Marsh mention various factors that let policy makers engage in policy transfer 
including  external  ones  that  shape  the  motivations  of  actors  and  the  context  of  policy 
formulation.  Among  these  factors  are  globalisation,  growing  interdependence  and 
externalities, technological progress, the fear of competitive disadvantages and the emergence 
of an international consensus on the ‘right solution’. The authors furthermore differentiate 
between voluntary and involuntary transfer, both of which have different underlying reasons. 
While voluntary transfer is widely driven by dissatisfaction with the Status Quo, involuntary 
transfer  is  –  in  its  extremest  form  –  based  on  direct  imposition.
7  However,  as  concrete 
instances of such transfers may lie somewhere in between these two poles, it is better to 
conceive of the degree of rationality in the transfer process as a continuum. In the case of EU-
Mercosur relations, the  transfer falls somewhere in the middle of this spectrum.  It is not 
completely involuntary as both sides entered into the negotiations voluntarily and the EU does 
not dispose of the formal power to coerce Mercosur into policy transfer without its consent.
8 
On the other side, it is neither completely voluntary, as the EU has more leverage in the 
process due to power asymmetries (Westphal 2005a, Diedrichs 2003).
9 The EU may thus be 
characterized as a ‘policy-pusher’ in the biregional relations (Dolowitz/Marsh 1996: 348), 
while the process may generally be referred to as a ‘negotiated transfer’.   
 
The question of how policies are transferred refers to the forms of transfer. Dolowitz and 
Marsh distinguish four such forms that differ according to their similarity with the original: 
the copy (transfer of the object without changes), emulation (adaptation of the object to the 
new context), hybrid/synthesis (combination of (elements of) transfer objects from different 
jurisdictions) and inspiration (transfer of the underlying idea of a transfer object). In the case 
                                                 
6 These actors are also chosen for reasons of research practicality: they are the only ones that have published a 
critical mass of strategy papers or public communications to be analysed.   
7 Dolowitz and Marsh assert, however, that the “direct imposition of policy transfer by one country on another is 
rare” (1996: 348), but the conditionality applied by the World Bank or the EU in the enlargement process come 
close to this modus.  
8 This is the biggest difference between EU policy transfer to the accession countries compared to partners in 
other external relations (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004; Lavenex 2004) 
9 This structural power asymmetry between both sides can be attributed to three factors: firstly, the “unequal 
dependence” on the relationship which leads to a situation in which Mercosur “[is] exposed … to higher pressure 
by  political  rules-setting  …  and  political  preponderance”  (Westphal  2005a:  144);  secondly,  the  diverging 
coherence of both sides in the biregional negotiations (Diedrichs 2003: 201, Nugent 1995); and thirdly the fact 





of the EU’s policy export intentions, forms of transfer refer to the similarity of the intended 
transfer object in relation with the internal original, i.e. a policy or programme implemented 
in  the  EU  itself.  The  transfer  form  can  vary  between  different  transfer  processes  and  is 
influenced by the actors involved and the organisation of the transfer process.  
 
 
Policy Transfer in the Relations with Mercosur 
 
This section presents empirical evidence to show that the EU uses policy transfer as a tool to 
structure  its  biregional  relations  with  Mercosur.  It  is  arranged  along  the  four  research 
questions outlined above and differentiates – within each section – between the three ‘pillars’ 
of the biregional relations: trade and economic relations, political dialogue and cooperation.  
 
What is being transferred? (Transfer objects) 
 
In the trade field, the EU approach to trade liberalisation with Mercosur swings between 
harmonisation and mutual recognition of non-tariff barriers to trade.
10 The Commission states 
that the goal of the EC’s trade policy is “[to promote], where feasible, greater harmonisation 
of standards and regulatory approaches in other markets; [to encourage] our trading partners 
to adopt or accept the equivalence of standards and technical requirements applicable in the 
Community” (EC 1996: 5). The ultimate goal behind this approach is similar to the one set 
out for the accession countries, the only difference being that no formal conditionality can be 
applied. A civil servant in the Commission confirmed that the EU aims at transferring the 
most completely possible the EU- trade acquis to Mercosur:  “EU policy  is to spread the 
European approach” (EC 2000: 20). In order to do so, the EU needs to continuously prepare 
Mercosur so that “[u]ltimately, the technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures […] will become, if not harmonised, then at least fully compatible“ (EC 1998: 
Chapter 7.1.2). This involves to large extents the intention to engage in policy export and 
reflects the own experience of 40  years of internal market regulation.
11  The EU supports 
Mercosur  in  making  its  regulatory  standards  compatible  with  EU  regulations  through 
technical assistance and facilitation measures. Therefore, the EU initiated various projects “to 
harmonise  standardisation  and  verification  practices  in  the  Mercosur  region,  in  line  with 
European […] rules” (press release 12.03.2004). These programmes include the transfer of 
testing  methods  (policy  instrument)  and  calibration  bureaus  (institutions)  (press  release 
12.03.2004), the development of information and notification systems (policy instruments) as 
well as certification and accreditation agencies (institutions) and support for the development 
of a consistent legal and industrial metrology in Mercosur (EC 1996: 30, EC 2000: 21). All of 
these  programmes  guaranteed  that  “[t]he  technical  norms  which  were  introduced  in 
MERCOSUR area were EU ones” (Westphal 2005a: 173). In preparation for the Association 
Agreement, the EU is increasingly eager to ‘push’ Mercosur to adopt sectoral policies similar 
to  EU  practices.  In  the  field  of  competition,  for  instance,  the  EU  aims  at  “stimulating 
Mercosur to adopt legislation […] which is basically inspired by the EU competition policy” 
                                                 
10  Harmonisation  is  the  more  demanding  regulatory  approach  as  it  involves  the  export  of  policy  contents, 
whereas mutual recognition only entails the export of policy goals. However, mutual recognition presupposes a 
certain degree of compatibility of trade regulations which requires some previous harmonisation, be it through 
transfer or otherwise. For a good analysis of the policy transfer of mutual recognition agreements in EU-US 
trade relations see Steffenson 2002. On mutual recognition more generally see Nicolaidis 2001.  
11 The EU started out with a harmonisation approach in the regulation of the internal market, but changed that 
strategy to mutual recognition after the Cassis de Dijon-ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1979 because 
the former approach turned out to be too costly politically and economically.   
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(EC 2002: 24). And one of the ultimate goals in institutional support for Mercosur is the 
“creation of Mercosur regulatory bodies” (EC 2002: 29-30).  
 
In the field of economic relations, the EU is active in two main fields which both entail (the 
intention)  to  policy  export:  programmes  to  support  the  economy  and  promote  investment 
(AL-INVEST, URB-AL, ATLAS)
12 and advice in the coordination of the national economic 
policies in Mercosur. Concerning the former, the programmes are modelled after those in the 
EU’s  regional  policy  containing  some  of  the  same  characteristic  elements:  decentralized 
organization, co-financing by the beneficiary, similar target groups, e.g. SMEs (AL-INVEST) 
border regions (ATLAS), troubled inner city districts (URB-AL), and the objective to foster 
networking  between  the  different  decentralised  actors.  While  this  programme  export  is  a 
transfer object in itself, it also serves as a framework to export policy goals, contents and 
instruments.  Furthermore,  the  EU  uses  programme  transfer  in  those  areas  that  it  has 
recognized as crucial for its own economic development: “[T]he strength of the EU economic 
model is an important point of comparison in biregional relations” (Grabendorff 1999: 99). 
Hence,  programme  export  is  also  used  as  a  ‘vehicle’  for  the  subtle  transfer  of  a  specific 
economic governance model which reaches far beyond the mere export intention of policy 
goals. Concerning the second main field in economic relations, the EU intends to establish a 
regular macroeconomic dialogue similar to the one within the EU which it prepares through 
technical assistance in the form of “the transfer of experience in regard to the coordination 
and adoption of decisions” (EC 1995: 132; own translation). Eventually, this should lead to 
“defining common policies for the four Mercosur countries in fields such as tax policy, public 
debt, payments policy, price stability” (EC 2002: 44).  
 
The  political  dialogue,  the  second  ‘pillar’  of  the  biregional  relations,  is  seen  as  an 
opportunity to transfer European know-how in the fields of democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights. This forms a central theme in the strategy documents of all three institutions. 
The biregional relations are intended to be based on the same principles than the EU itself: 
“[T]he respect for human rights and democratic principles will constitute an essential element 
of a new agreement. This principle will be subject to a specific suspension clause in the case 
of non-compliance” (ES 1995: 107; own translation). Besides this ‘value foundation’ which is 
neither negotiable nor modifiable, the EU also aims at transferring internal policy priorities 
through the political dialogue, often without concrete policy contents. Hence, the topics of 
terrorism, sustainable development, and immigration
13 are regularly subjects of the political 
dialogue. In sum, in the political dialogue the EU is mainly interested in the transfer of basic 
values and principles that are closest to the category of policy goals, but are also connected to 
ideas and attitudes.  
 
In the third cooperation ‘pillar’, which includes areas of mutual interest that go beyond trade 
and political co-ordination, the EU primarily intends to transfer know-how and programmes. 
Concerning  the  former,  the  Commission  saw  the  main  goal  of  the  1995  Framework 
Agreement in the “interchange of experience in the field of [regional] integration” (EC 1995: 
105;  own  translation)  which  is  one  of  the  main  objectives  until  today.  This  transfer  of 
experience was envisaged for the following institutions: the Group of the Common Market 
and  the  Trade  Commission  with  the  European  Commission,  Mercosur’s  Consultative 
Economic and Social Forum with the Economic and Social Commission, the Parliamentary 
Commission  with  the  EP  and  the  Mercosur  tribunal  with  the  European  Court  of  Justice. 
                                                 
12 These programmes are open to all Latin Americana countries, not only to Mercosur member states.  
13 The Council gave the Commission the task to negotiate a clause in the Association Agreement stipulating that 
illegal  immigrants  from  Mercosur  may  be  deported  back  to  their  countries  of  origin  (Interview  European 
Commission).   
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Beyond the intention to the export of integration know-how, the EU also aimed at “supporting 
the elaboration of sectoral policies in fields such as education, health and the development of 
rural areas, whereby measures to institutionally support and mobilise the knowledge of civil 
society should have priority” (Council 1995: 1; own translation from German). In regard to 
this goal, the EU sought  to support the definition of a Mercosur energy policy and pushing 
Mercosur  to  make  environmental  protection  and  sustainable  development  a  cross-section 
issue in all areas of cooperation (policy goals) which the EU had integrated as such into the 
Maastricht Treaty only shortly before
14 (EC 1995). Other areas designated for cooperation 
which include far-reaching policy transfer intentions in view of the Association Agreement 
include: the mutual participation of scientists in S&T programmes leading to “convergence of 
S&T policies in the two regions” (EC 2002: 24), the establishment of an university student 
exchange programme in Mercosur similar to the European ERASMUS programme (EC 2002: 
46), the development of a trans-Mercosur traffic network modelled after the Transeuropean 
Network  (Interview European Commission), and a programme to support the information 
society in Mercosur which corresponds to an EU-internal priority in the framework of the 
Lisbon strategy. Hence, similar to economic relations, the EU intends to transfer objects it has 
recognized to be important in its own internal development. All of the programmes in this 
pillar have since the beginning been subjected to co-financing by the other side: “Financial 
contributions  by  the  beneficiary  must  be  systematically  incorporated  into  those  measures 
where  their  financial  means  allow  for  it”  (EC  1995:  142;  own  translation).  This  may  be 
categorized as the intended transfer of a policy instrument borrowed from regional policy. 
 
In sum, the EU intends to transfer all the transfer objects as identified by Dolowitz and Marsh 
except ideologies. While transfer intentions play a much bigger role (in regard to the diversity 
as  well  as  quantity  of  the  transfer  objects)  in  the  field  of  trade,  economic  relations  and 
cooperation, it is mainly restricted to the intended transfer of integration experience, policy 
goals  and  ideas  in  the  political  dialogue.  This  may  best  be  explained  by  the  different 
institutional structures of the EU in these two fields: the Commission as a supranational actor 
refers much more to internal models (and thus policy transfer) in the structuring of external 
relations  than  the  Council  with  its  orientation  at  national  interests.  Furthermore,  political 
dialogue  is  a  very  different  form  of  interaction  than  the  first  and  third  pillars  that  are 
essentially  based  upon  programmes  and  concrete  policies.  Hence,  the  political  dialogue 
assumes rather a support function of the other two pillars. 
 
Who are the Agents Involved in the Transfer Process? (Transfer actors) 
 
As noted before, this article focuses on the three most relevant actors in EU-Mercosur policy-
making, namely the Commission, Council and the EP. All three institutions voiced intentions 
to policy transfer and played their role in structuring the biregional relations with Mercosur, 
albeit to different extents. 
 
In the trade pillar, it was the Commission who most actively aimed at policy transfer and at 
structuring  the  biregional  relations  by  such  means.  While  this  might  not  be  completely 
surprising  due  to  its  formal  competencies  in  trade  (Meunier/Nicolaidis  2005),  it  is  still 
remarkable  that  the  Commission  initiated  practically  all  measures  in  this  area.  Even  the 
                                                 
14 Interestingly, the environmental areas which the EU set as priorities in the biregional relations are widely the 
same ones than those mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty. For Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), Longo analyses 
this relationship between internal and external policy priorities under the headline of ‘extension’ which she 
defines as the “quantity of specific issues involved in the co-operation among those considered relevant for 




negotiation  mandates  drawn  up  by  the  Council  correspond  widely  with  the  respective 
proposals by the Commission (Interview European Commission; see also Diedrichs 2003: 
256). This justifies the characterization of the Commission as a policy entrepreneur whose 
proposals to dominate the internal policy agenda towards Mercosur were widely drawn up 
around policy export. The Council conceives of its role mostly as supporting the Commission 
and intervening only when its proposals are completely unacceptable or when it wants to 
make it aware of specific European interests. The EP constantly supported the economic and 
trade relations with Mercosur without disposing of formal powers to be able to influence the 
EU’s course of action towards Mercosur. The EP strongly supported or demanded to take into 
consideration the rights of employees and opted for the inclusion of a wide array of actors into 
the biregional relations (EP 2001: 2) “…in view of the desire of the Mercosur countries … to 
not be excluded from the European market after the preferential free trade agreements” with 
the MEEC, Turkey and Israel (EP 1995: 3; own translation from German). 
 
The political dialogue constituted a domain of the Council where the Commission showed a 
relative reluctance to actively influence the activities in that pillar. The institutional structure 
of  the  political  dialogue  accounts  in  part  for  this  difference  as  it  is  conducted  in  the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which is firmly in the hands 
of the Council. Beyond the ‘value clauses’ which all three institutions agreed to incorporate 
into any treaty with Mercosur, the Council also pushed to include other topics mentioned 
above into a future Association Agreement: “The Council has asked the negotiators to take 
into account all the different clauses of the political dialogue. Of course the trade people in the 
Commission don’t see non-proliferation [of weapons of mass destruction] as a priority. Or 
cooperation against terrorism has nothing to do with projects or development or these sorts of 
things” (Interview General Secretariat of the Council). While the EP is widely excluded from 
the processes in the framework of CFSP, it pushed for the institutionalization of the abstract 
principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights and for the participation of other actors 
in the political dialogue (EP 2001: 2): „[T]he new negotiation mandate [must] provide for 
concrete measures necessary to secure that the stipulations of the future agreement are really 
in  accord  with  the  mission  of  the  Treaty  of  the  Union,  whereby  the  development  and 
consolidation of democracy and rule of law and the respect for human rights are goals of the 
CFSP” (EP 2001: 1; own translation from German). Diedrichs therefore refers to the EP as a 
“cooperative team-mate” (2003: 250).
15  
 
In the cooperation pillar, the pattern of actor activity in regard to policy transfer intentions is 
similar to the one in the trade pillar. In many ways, the Commission independently defines the 
areas  it  wants  to  incorporate  in  biregional  cooperation  and  develops  them  by  designing 
programmes  and  other  measures.  Hence,  also  in  this  field  the  Commission  merits  the 
characterization  of  policy  entrepreneur.  As  vital  national  interests  are  less  ‘threatened’  in 
biregional cooperation, the Council widely left this field including the fostering of regional 
integration in Mercosur to the Commission (Interview General Secretariat of the Council). It 
intervened only rarely to circumscribe the Commission’s activities by defining priority areas 
for cooperation and determining principles for its design (e.g. ‘open regionalism’, Council 
1995: 2). The EP was supportive of the Commission’s efforts to foster regional integration in 
Mercosur,  while  bringing  forward  own  priorities  centred  mainly  on  inclusion  and 
participation as well as social and environmental norms (EP 1995: 4-5). It furthermore opted 
for an extension of the EU’s tool box to foster regional integration: “In the meantime, the EU 
                                                 
15 It has to be noted that the EP conducts its own ‘political dialogue’ with regional parliaments in Latin America 
including Mercosur and fosters close personal ties with politicians and parliamentarians in the region (Westphal 
2005b: 390).  
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must support the regional integration process in Mercosur with all instruments at its disposal – 
not only through technical assistance” (CEER 1995: 221, own translation). 
 
In sum, all three actors voiced intentions to policy transfer. However, the Commission clearly 
took the most active stance in the first and third pillar of the relations – a finding one of its 
representatives confirms: “The Commission is the most active part in designing the biregional 
relations”  (Interview  European  Commission).  Diedrichs  attributes  this  to  the  fact  that  the 
Commission – with its 1994 communication – “was the first organ of the EU that presented an 
elaborated and coherent strategy for Mercosur and thereby positioned itself ahead of other 
actors”  (2003:  123).  This  is  linked  to  the  fact  that  the  very  idea  of  biregional  relations 
originated in and was subsequently primarily driven by the Commission. This holds also true 
for its intentions to policy transfer which supports the thesis that the ‘first mover’ also has 
advantages in the formation of the external relations. Considering its formal competences in 
this field, the Commission might more precisely be described as a “structural first mover” 
(Héritier 1996: 153).
16 Therefore, the Commission’s role in the first and third pillar is that of a 
policy entrepreneur as it continuously influenced the political agenda by putting forward its 
own  transfer  ideas  and  transfer  innovations,  so  that  the  Council  never  disputed  the 
Commission’s  role  (Diedrichs  2003:  250).
17  Not  only  did  it  carry  out  external  trade  and 
development  policy  functions  in  the  framework  of  community  competences,  but  the 
Commission also elaborated extensive policy concepts for Mercosur that “included CFSP and 
exhibited  firm  political  traits“  (Diedrichs  2003:  255).  According  to  Diedrichs,  it  thereby 
profited from the growing cross pillarization between EC and CFSP issues (Stetter 2004) and 
the call of Mercosur countries for quick implementation of the framework agreement which 
allowed the Commission to “develop a profile and (limited) influence beyond formal treaty 
competences” (2003: 255). This holds true for policy transfer intentions in the third pillar, but 
not for the political dialogue. Concerning this extension of influence beyond formal treaty 
competences  in  the  external  relations  (cf.  Cram  1994),  the  Commission  relied  on  similar 
means it uses internally: since the beginning, it sought to align different actors with itself as 
an institution and with specific European policy goals and contents (Tömmel 2003). This 
began with the signing of the Interinstitutional Cooperation Agreement, continued through 
time  by  providing  technical  assistance  in  different  areas  and  now  also  includes  the 
involvement of decentralised actors in the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue and other 
programs that engage civil society actors. These Commission activities hint at ‘new forms of 
governance’ in the external relations of the EU (see next section).
18  
 
The  role  or  influence  of  the  Council  is  complementary  to  that  of  the  Commission.  The 
Council primarily dominated the agenda of the political dialogue. Thus, besides the ‘first 
mover’  advantage,  formal  competences  also  appear  to  be  important.  However,  while  the 
Council  has  important  formal  competences  in  the  formation  of  external  relations  at  its 
disposal, the analysis revealed that it assumed  a largely  reserved role in regard to policy 
transfer intentions. The Council was most active in those fields that refer to fundamental 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, in the field where the Commission does not have the formal competences to be a ‘structural first 
mover’ (the political dialogue), it is not very active in regard to policy transfer intentions. However, a civil 
servant  from  the  Council  Secretariat  hints  at  the  fact  that  the  Commission  has  a  structural  advantage  in 
comparison to the Council in all areas of the biregional relations because it negotiates international treaties on 
behalf of the Union which allows it to act as an ‘information gate keeper’. 
17 Diedrichs largely attributes this to the fact that the Commission “when confronting crucial moments in the 
negotiations knew how to maintain its coherence and capacity to act – even despite internal resistance” (2003: 
254). This confirms Nugent’s finding of the ‘relative cohesion’ of the Commission (1995: 605).  
18 Tömmel notes in this context that the setting-up of a “structured interaction” is an important element of these 
new forms of governance. Besides state actors, it increasingly involves active networking by the Commission to 
bring together non-state actors as well (2003: 139).   
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transfer objects and basic goals of the Union. It thereby often set the limits for more concrete 
policy transfer intentions of the Commission and assumed an important support and control 
function. The EP continuously supported the policy transfer intentions of the Commission. 
However,  despite  its  relative  lack  of  formal  competences,  it  was  able  to  emphasize  an 
independent focus as a “commentator and agenda-setter” (Westphal 2005b: 391): besides the 
already  described  involvement  of  decentralized  actors,  the  EP  constantly  demanded  the 
strengthening of social and political values in the biregional relations.
19  
 
Why and how is a policy transferred? (Transfer reasons and forms) 
 
Some of the more general reasons or external factors mentioned by Dolowitz and Marsh play 
a role in regard to policy transfer intentions in the EU context. The increasing process of 
globalisation as a more general factor and the fear of competitive disadvantages especially in 
regard to the US are often mentioned by EU institutions and different authors as influential 
reasons  to  engage  in  biregional  relations  with  Mercosur  (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet  2000, 
Diedrichs 2003, CEER 1995, ESC 2001). However, they do not explain why actors aim at 
structuring those biregional relations through policy transfer.  
 
Concerning the first pillar, the EU aims at the transfer of internal norms and standards for 
economic reasons “in view of the economies of scale it brings to producers, the potential 
access to multiple markets on the strength of a single product assessment and the likelihood of 
regional structures using international standards and practices” (EC 1996: 16). These reasons 
are based on own experiences with the internal market and external trade relations: “When 
conceived in a spirit of openness, regional integration – as European experience attests – is 
accompanied by growth in international trade” (EC 1994: 3).
20 Positive own experiences then 
justify policy transfer as a feasible strategy: “The coherence of regulations and of standards 
can be achieved through harmonisation, which has already proved its usefulness in the context 
of the EU internal market” (EC 2000: 10). The ultimate goal of the EU’s transfer intentions in 
the trade pillar is to “promote […] acceptance of the Community’s regulatory approach” (EC 
1996: 4). These motives have to do with the increasing process of globalisation and enhanced 
international  competitiveness  which  Westphal  describes  as  the  aim  to  “simultaneously 
promote and export the European structural model of the internal market with its current drive 
to keep alive basic principles of the so-called “Rheinischer Kapitalismus”… [which is] an 
attempt to protect the European labour market by increasing the standards in other world 
regions” (2005a: 172). Or, if seen in the context of international competition with the US over 
more  uniform  rules  for  the  world  economy,  policy  transfer  of  trade  rules  serves  to  gain 
leverage in the WTO (Faust 2005: 54). 
 
Concerning political dialogue, reasons for policy export are linked to the EU’s interest in 
fostering certain ideas: “Politically, it [EU] has an interest in the consolidation of democratic 
systems [and] shared values” (EC 1994: 4). This is linked to a belief in the superiority of a 
certain global world order which is based on the values the EU tries to foster in Mercosur: 
“We have a model of external relations which is away from the classical 19
th century model. 
It’s  based  on  the  rule  of  law.  We  believe  that  regional  integration  is  a  new  model  of 
international relations by which at least within the region countries decide to organize their 
                                                 
19 Smith therefore calls the EP a ‘norm entrepreneur’, i.e. “an individual or organization that sets out to change 
the behaviour of others” (Florini cited in Smith 1998: 259).  
20  A  civil  servant  from  the  Commission  explained  the  development  of  the  macroeconomic  dialogue  with 
Mercosur in a similar vein arguing that Mercosur has the same problem with sharp macroeconomic fluctuations 
and divergent policies in the different member states today that the EU had in the 1980s, so the EU ‘has some 
experience about this problem’.   
 
13 
relationship through the rule of law ... So basically, instead of killing one another in the plains 
of  Waterloo,  people  are  actually  negotiating  with  one  another”  (Interview  European 
Commission).  The  reasons  for  policy  transfer  in  the  cooperation  pillar  centre  on  the 
conviction that the EU’s own model of regional integration can serve as a model for Mercosur 
and that Mercosur has repeatedly stressed its intention to profit from the EU’s own experience 
(EC  1995:  112).  In  sum,  policy  transfer  is  pursued  for  different  kinds  of  reasons  that 
encompass blunt self-interest, liberal internationalist ideas of a ‘just’ world order  and the 
constructivist reasoning of the perception of oneself as a role model.  
 
The empirical analysis allows no general statement about the forms of transfer. It suggests, 
however, that all transfer forms take their part in the EU’s intentions to policy transfer with 
the  hybrid/synthesis  mainly  important  in  the  export  of  programmes.  The  emphasis  of 
Commission communications and the interview partners on the fact that the EU does not want 
to impose its own model hints at the inspiration as the primary form of transfer. They argue 
that Mercosur would have to decide independently which models best serve his interests and 
needs while being able to rely on EU experience and support: “EC wishes to be at its side 
with  a  supportive  co-operation  strategy”  (EC  2002:  4).  However,  other  parts  of  the 
communications  and  some  of  the  transfer  objects  already  implemented  speak  a  different 
language: there, the copy seems to be the most widely used form of the original transfer 
intentions. That emulation does not play a prominent role in the EU’s transfer intentions may 
be explained by the fact that the adaptation to different policy contexts is not expressed in 
strategy documents; it evolves during the implementation process of a policy.   
 
Furthermore,  the  empirical  data  suggests  an  interesting  link  between  the  form  of  policy 
transfer and the degree of coerciveness: the more coercive the policy transfer intention of the 
EU, the more likely it is that the copy is the preferred form of transfer. In other words, the 
lower the degree of coerciveness, the more the  transfer form moves into the direction of 
inspiration, i.e. the further it moves away from the original. This connection implies that the 
form of policy transfer permits conclusions about the degree of coerciveness as well as the 
other way around. The explanation for this phenomenon seems obvious: while the lender, for 
reasons of transfer costs and experience, has an interest in a transfer of objects as close as 
possible to the copy (e.g. his own original), the borrower is mostly concerned with the smooth 




Policy Transfer as a Form of ‘External Governance’? 
 
Various authors have pointed out that the European integration process not only feeds back 
into  the  political  systems  of  the  member  states  –  a  phenomenon  that  has  been  termed 
‘Europeanization’  (Green  Cowles  et  al.  2001,  Featherstone/Radaelli  2003)  –,  but  that  its 
repercussions reach beyond the EU itself because of a “spillover effect of its own internal 
policies” (Nicolaidis/Lacroix 2002: 148; see also Kux/Sverdrup 2000, Lavenex 2004). Hence, 
Europeanization  also  has  an  ‘external  dimension’  which  affects  third  countries 
(Lavenex/Uçarer  2004).  However,  this  external  dimension  is  more  than  some  unintended 
spillover or diffusion of European models, but – as the analysis has shown – rather bears 
witness to the EU’s active promotion of the externalization of its own governance model. This 
phenomenon  has  in  the  EuroMed  context  been  called  ‘Europeanization  without  Europe’ 
(Escribano 2005). The policy transfer of internally created rules appears to be the easiest and 
most convenient way to enhance the problem-solving capacity of the EU’s domestic policies 
by extending its reach beyond the EU’s borders. Hence, in the EU context there is a close  
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linkage between the concepts of policy transfer, ‘Europeanization’ and the externalization of 
the European model. We may conceptualize the relationship between the three as follows: 
Policy transfer is one of the instruments used by the EU to externalize its governance models 
in order to ‘Europeanize’ third countries or regions, in this case Mercosur. In this context, the 
EU’s propensity to policy transfer may be characterized as a “strategic attempt to gain control 
over policy developments through external governance” (Lavenex 2004: 693). 
 
Generally, governance encompasses two dimensions: an internal one which is mainly about 
the creation of rules and their implementation within a political system, and an external one 
which  refers  to  the  transfer  of  given  EU  rules  and  their  adoption  by  non-member  states 
(Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004: 661). Applied to this case study, EU intentions to policy 
transfer encompass both, the direct transfer of EU rules to Mercosur (external dimension) and 
the intention to ‘push’ Mercosur to adopt own rules along the lines of or inspired by EU rules 
(internal dimension). Although all EU rules will have to be adopted by Mercosur through a 
regular internal policy-making process, these two dimensions are analytically distinct: the EU 
tries both to exercise external governance (transfer of rules, esp. trade field) and influence 
‘internal’ governance (creation of rules, e.g. macroeconomic policy, tax policy, environmental 
policy) in its favour. Nevertheless, the agreements with Mercosur serve as “instruments of 
governance and tools through which the EU contributes to the regulation of the Southern 
Cone”  (Grugel  2002:  6).  This  reasoning  may  be  linked  to  the  forms  of  transfer  the  EU 
envisages  which  in  turn  supports  the  hypothesis  formulated  above  about  the  association 
between forms of transfer and the degree of coerciveness: while the first three transfer forms 
copy, emulation and hybrid/synthesis are closely related with the transfer of rules through 
external  governance,  inspiration  points  more  into  the  direction  of  influencing  internal 
governance. This double-track strategy serves two distinct aims: external governance seeks to 
“bind  third  countries  to  the  pursuit  of  internal  policy  goals”  (Lavenex  2004:  702)  while 
influencing internal governance is about “[creating] an international environment that is as 
similar  as  possible  to  or  at  least  compatible  with  the  European  multi-level  system” 
(Wagner/Schimmelfennig/Knodt  2004:  152).  In  order  to  attain  this  goal,  the  EU  has 
continuously  intended  –  besides  exporting  concrete  transfer  objects  like  institutions  and 
programmes – to transfer certain basic principles or convictions such as participation and 
inclusion, democracy, the rule of law, human and social rights, environmental protection and 
sustainable development. These principles serve as the amalgam linking all transfer objects 
together to form a coherent context of meaning. The working group of the Mercosur-Chaire at 
the  Sciences  Po  Institute  explains  this  EU  course  of  action  as  follows:  “The  EU  has 
‘delegitimised’ nationalism and power politics among its membership, and is driven to shape 
world politics along the same lines. Built on a multilateral model which it tends to project on 
the wider international  scene, the EU is ill at ease with either a unipolar or a multipolar 
system  heavily  reliant  on  military  power.  Therefore  it  propounds  a  system  based  on 
universally accepted norms and rules – a multilateral system – that emphasizes the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms over the sovereign rights of states” (WGEUM 2003: 11). 
 
While the external dimension of governance is generally about the transfer of given EU rules, 
the concept can further be differentiated according to the policy goals that are being pursued 
through it. External governance can serve both internal and foreign policy goals (Lavenex 
2004: 681): policy transfer in the fields of trade, environmental and social policy serves to 
increase the efficiency and problem-solving capacity of internal EU policies, while transfer 
intentions in the political dialogue and cooperation field rather serve foreign policy goals such 
as “shaping a corresponding environment” similar to the EU’s own system (Westphal 2005a: 
185)  or  promote  trade  as  well  as  equal  social  and  economic  development 
(Söderbaum/Stålgren/Langenhove 2005: 370). It should be noted, however, that both policy  
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goals are closely connected. Hence, the EU’s form of external governance reaches further 
than the mere “extension of the legal boundary of authority beyond institutional integration” 
(Lavenex  2004:  691),  which  aims  primarily  at  the  stabilization  of  “borders  and  the 
commercial policy in which it operates” (Forster 2000: 789). The EU aims at propelling a 
“global  cooperation  culture“
21  (Bodemer  2002:  108)  with  a  “distinct  ethical  dimension” 
(Smith 2001: 202).
22  In this context, policy transfer constitutes an important element in an 
“attempt to tackle interdependencies through the external projection of internal solutions” 
(Lavenex 2004: 703) or – more broadly speaking – the projection of an internal concept of 
legitimate order
23 (Jachtenfuchs 2001, Nicolaidis/Lacroix 2002) which “is closely connected 
to the EU’s normative ideas of how a new world order should be constructed” (Faust 2005: 
43).  
 
This model of European external governance rests mainly on traditional forms of governance, 
so-called ‘old governance’ characterized by hierarchical patterns of command and control. 
However,  it  increasingly  encompasses  forms  of  ‘new’  or  ‘network  governance’ 
(Eising/Kohler-Koch 1999; see also Peters 2000). Similar to distributive policies within the 
EU, the Union does “not directly intervene into the social sphere […] of third countries“, but 
aims at “activating [and propelling networking among] decentralised governance agents and 
the use of their action resources in order to realize European policy goals” (Tömmel 2003: 
137). Without “the attempt to bind third countries to the pursuit of internal policy goals and 
thereby  benefit  from  the  latter’s  [and  decentralized  actors’]  political  and  problem-solving 
resources” (Lavenex 2004: 702), effective governance in the international arena seems to be 
largely out of reach. Hence, while the EU puts forward normative justifications for policy 
transfer in the direction of “a benevolent projection of acquired civilian virtues” (Ibid.: 693) 
or  “externalizing  a  certain  European  tradition  of  justice”  (Nicolaidis/Lacroix  2002:  137), 
external governance is essentially about effective problem-solving (and the pursuit of sheer 
self-interest) in an increasingly interdependent international context. From a normative point 
of view, however, it remains to be seen “whether the EU can escape the adjacent risk of (even 
benign) imperialism” which stays ‘in the air’ ever since the 19
th century when Europe seeks to 
transfer  its  model  to  other  places  of  the  world  and  power  asymmetries  are  at  play 
(Meunier/Nicolaidis 2005: 266).  
 
 
Conclusion and Outlook 
 
The empirical analysis revealed two main findings: firstly, the transfer objects are represented 
with different quantities in the three pillars of the biregional relations and secondly, policy 
transfer intentions of the EU are distributed unevenly over the pillars.  Concerning policy 
transfer,  this  hints  at  a  pattern  of  “policy  patchwork”  (Héritier  1996:  149)  rather  than  a 
coherent “policy transfer strategy” (Dolowitz 2003: 104). The only exception is the systematic 
and  continuous  transfer  of  European  knowledge  and  experience  in  the  field  of  regional 
integration.  These  findings  formed  the  background  for  the  more  general  argument  that 
emerging patterns of biregional relations between the EU and other regional groupings are 
                                                 
21 This argument is supported by the fact that the EU prefers ‘positive conditionality’ or ‘critical dialogue’ to 
‘negative conditionality’ aimed at punishment in the case of non-compliance when sponsoring human rights 
(Smith 1998: 265). In this context, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier speak of a “strategy of reinforcement by 
reward” (2004: 3). 
22 For a critical evaluation of the EU’s ambitions in this regard see Nicolaidis/Lacroix 2002.  
23 For the external human rights and democracy policy of the EU, for instance, Smith states that “the EU is […] 




accompanied by the upsurge of distinct patterns of governance in which policy transfer plays 
an important role, as demonstrated by the EU-Mercosur case. 
 
Although  not  subject  of  this  article,  the  results  also  have  repercussions  for  the  debate  in 
international relations about the EU as an international actor. The governance structures of 
biregional relations seem to strengthen the EU’s role as a ‘civilian power’ in the international 
realm (Grugel 2002). A next step would be to analyse in how far the findings of this article 
are transferable to other biregional relations of the EU. Thus, further comparative studies on 
other biregional relations are necessary to gain more insights into the logic and mechanisms 
of this relatively new form of international relations and find more explanatory factors that 
account for differences and similarities in such relations. This article has left some interesting 
questions unanswered: What does the end result of the EU’s transfer intentions look like? Is 
policy transfer effectively implemented in Mercosur? How does the other side react to the 
policy transfer intentions of the EU? What contextual factors influence the success or failure 
of  policy  transfer?  What  role  does  power  play  in  the  actual  transfer  and  subsequent 
implementation process? What about the issue of legitimacy of the EU’s approach? 
 
Preliminary research has shown some interesting starting points for the theoretical linking 
between the policy transfer framework and concepts of ‘external governance’ or governance 
more generally. So far, policy export has primarily been analysed in the direct neighbourhood 
of the EU, especially towards the new accession countries (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004 
and  2005,  Lavenex  2004).  However,  little  research  has  been  done  on  EU  policy  export 
worldwide, and no consistent and systematic linking between the concepts of policy transfer 
and ‘external governance’ takes place beyond the EU’s direct neighbourhood. This analysis 
has  nevertheless  shown  that  they  would  be  compatible  through  their  claims  to  overarch 
different subfields of the discipline and their dealing with “forms, outcomes, problems and 
development  paths”  of  policy  processes  (Jachtenfuchs  2001:  256).  Such  a  connection 
promises that individual elements of the policy process identified through the policy transfer 
framework could be analysed in regard to their efficacy and legitimacy, the latter constituting 
an element that is often criticised for being widely neglected by the governance approach 
(Ibid.: 258). We could then try to answer questions such as: What role does policy transfer 
play  in  ‘external  governance’  more  generally?  And  what  implications  does  this  have  for 
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